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ARTICLE
Reflections on the (Post-)Human Condition:  
Towards New Forms of Engagement with the World?
Simon Susen
Department of Sociology, School of Arts and Social Sciences, City, University of London, London, UK
ABSTRACT
The main purpose of this paper is to examine the validity of the contention 
that, over the past decades, we have been witnessing the rise of the 
‘posthuman condition’. To this end, the analysis draws on the work of the 
contemporary philosopher Rosi Braidotti. The paper is divided into four 
parts. The first part centres on the concept of posthumanism, suggesting 
that it reflects a systematic attempt to challenge humanist assumptions 
underlying the construction of ‘the human’. The second part focuses on the 
concept of post-anthropocentrism, demonstrating that it articulates a desire 
to reject the twin ideas of ‘species supremacism’ and ‘human exceptional-
ism’, which it seeks to replace with ‘species egalitarianism’ and ‘monistic 
vitalism’. The third part is concerned with the concept of critical posthuma-
nities, positing that its advocacy is based on the cross-fertilization of post-
humanism and post-anthropocentrism. The fourth part offers an assessment 
of the ‘posthuman condition’ thesis, evaluating the extent to which it sheds 
new light on the ways in which our engagements with the world are shaped 
by the confluence of zoe-, geo-, and techno-based dimensions. The paper 
concludes with a brief summary of the key insights gained from the pre-
ceding inquiry.
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The main purpose of this paper is to examine the validity of the contention that, over the past 
decades, we have been witnessing the rise of the ‘posthuman condition’. To this end, the analysis 
draws on the work of the contemporary philosopher Rosi Braidotti – arguably, one of the most 
influential supporters of the ‘posthuman condition’ thesis. The paper is divided into four parts:
The first part centres on the concept of posthumanism, suggesting that it reflects a systematic 
attempt to challenge humanist assumptions underlying the construction of ‘the human’. The second 
part focuses on the concept of post-anthropocentrism, demonstrating that it articulates a desire to 
reject the twin ideas of ‘species supremacism’ and ‘human exceptionalism’ which it seeks to replace 
with ‘species egalitarianism’ and ‘monistic vitalism’. The third part is concerned with the concept of 
critical posthumanities, positing that its advocacy is based on the cross-fertilization of posthumanism 
and post-anthropocentrism – an ambitious endeavour aimed at exploring the emergence of radically 
transformative modes of knowledge production, circulation, and consumption. The fourth part offers 
an assessment of the ‘posthuman condition’ thesis, evaluating the extent to which it sheds new light 
on the ways in which our engagements with the world are shaped by the confluence of zoe-, geo-, 
and techno-based dimensions.
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The paper concludes with a brief summary of the key insights gained from the preceding inquiry, 
maintaining that the ‘posthuman condition’ thesis raises various theoretical and empirical questions, 
the importance of which is illustrated in the relevance of Braidotti’s oeuvre to understanding 
contemporary societies. More specifically, it will be argued that Braidotti’s writings provide 
a powerful conceptual framework for addressing fundamental socio-philosophical issues such as 
‘exclusion’, ‘engagement’, and ‘empathy’.
I. Posthumanism
In the humanities and social sciences, the concept of ‘posthumanism’ has acquired a variety of 
meanings. In the most general sense, it refers to a systematic attempt to challenge humanist 
assumptions underlying the construction of ‘the human’. The question that arises, then, is how 
‘the human’ – including any forms of existence related to, if not dependent on, it – can be defined.
i. ‘The Human’
In recent decades, ‘the human has become a question mark’,1 indicating that it has become an 
increasingly contentious task to determine who and what counts – and, by implication, who and 
what does not count – as ‘human’. Just as one may be required to prove one’s ‘humanity’ when 
accessing a particular website by confirming that one is not a robot, one may be expected to present 
evidence of one’s ‘humanity’ when confronted with a number of behavioural choices by validating 
that one’s decision-making processes are guided by cognitively sound and morally justifiable 
considerations. In this sense, the concept of ‘the human’, notwithstanding the controversial nature 
of both its denotative and its connotative attributes, remains a (or, perhaps, even the) ‘basic unit of 
reference’2 – not only for defining who and what ‘counts as human’3 but also, crucially, for 
determining the extent to which particular aspects of reality are shaped by, or even hinge on, the 
existence of Homo sapiens.
‘[D]ualistic oppositions’4 have been, and continue to be, constructed and invoked to define ‘the 
human mostly by what it is not’,5 along the following lines: non-human vs. human, natural vs. 
cultural, emotional vs. rational, instinctual vs. intentional, impulsive vs. reflective, visceral vs. moral, 
physical vs. metaphysical, material vs. spiritual, heteronomous vs. autonomous. In a Cartesian sense, 
the human subject is ‘not an animal, not extended and inert matter, not a pre-programmed 
machine’.6 Conceptualized in a non-dualistic fashion, it appears that ‘to be human’ means to exist 
as a creature whose reality is permeated by the aforementioned tensions, permitting it to seek to 
leave behind its animal-like nature, while – paradoxically – not being able to negate, let alone to rise 
above, it. Put differently, we are at the same time ‘prehuman’, ‘human’, and ‘posthuman’ primates: 
our genealogy is an ineluctable part of our past, present, and future as a species.
While ‘the binary distinction human/non-human has been foundational for European thought 
since the Enlightenment’,7 it appears that not every human culture relies on this major theoretical 
and practical separation.8 This dividing line is tantamount to a ‘Great Divide’,9 by means of which it 
has been possible to associate the concept of ‘humanity’ with the imaginary of ‘the West’: ‘the same 
gesture of exclusion that made the human species the biological analogue of the anthropological 
West, confusing all the other species and peoples in a common, privative alterity’.10 Insofar as the 
human/non-human binary pervades modern discourses, it represents a widely accepted mode of 
distinguishing between Homo sapiens and other species. Far from being an ‘objective’ or ‘value-free’ 
categorization, however, it is mobilized to attach particular – that is, historically, culturally, and 
ideologically variable – sets of attributes to ‘the human’ and ‘the non-human’, respectively.
If this is true, then critical social science is faced with the twofold task of re-positioning ‘the human 
after Humanism and anthropocentrism’11 and of uncovering the degree to which these seemingly 
‘neutral’ and ‘universal’ projects reflect the interests of some, rather than those shared by all, 
members of humanity. The principal challenge with which posthuman versions of critical thought 
are presented, therefore, is to succeed in describing, analysing, explaining, and assessing ‘the shifting 
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grounds on which new, diverse, and even contradictory understandings of the human are currently 
being generated, from a variety of sources, cultures, and traditions’.12 Such an undertaking obliges 
those committed to its critical spirit to reject ‘any simplistic or self-evident appeal to a generic and 
undifferentiated figure of the human, let alone to traditional, Eurocentric humanist values’.13 On this 
account, it is vital to perform a counterintuitive act – namely, to deconstruct the purportedly ‘neutral’ 
and ‘universal’ constitution of the concept of ‘the human’, exposing the extent to which its 
genealogy is based on an assemblage of context-, value-, meaning-, perspective-, interest-, power-, 
and tension-laden framings.14
ii. Humanism
Broadly speaking, the term ‘humanism’ designates a worldview that stresses the role and value of 
human agency in shaping the course of history. This supposition is crucial to the humanities, as 
reflected in their concern with the nature of knowledge (epistemology), the nature of being (ontology), 
the nature of argument (logic), the nature of morality (ethics), and the nature of expressive forms 
(aesthetics).15 In recent decades, however, humanism has been criticized from multiple angles, such as 
the following: poststructuralism,16 vital(ist) materialism,17 critical neo-materialism,18 feminist 
materialism,19 anti-racist and postcolonial movements,20 and posthumanism.21 Far from transcending, 
let alone eliminating, humanism, these – and similarly inclined – approaches are inevitably influenced 
by its lasting legacy. Indeed, ‘[c]ritiques of European Humanism pertain to the very tradition of 
European Humanism’.22 To put it bluntly, it is possible to critique humanism both with and against 
humanism.23 In a paradoxical fashion, posthumanism aims to move beyond humanism by unfolding 
both within and through it. It seeks to accomplish this by challenging and, ultimately, overcoming ‘the 
deeply engrained habits of anthropocentric thinking’.24 Rather than throwing the baby out with the 
bathwater, however, it is imperative to recognize ‘the undeniable strengths of Humanism’,25 notably 
the numerous forms of critical engagement with the world it has generated ever since it came into 
existence.
iii. ‘The Posthuman’ and Posthumanism
Over the past years, the concepts of ‘the posthuman’ and ‘posthumanism’26 have been gaining 
traction, especially in the humanities and social sciences. ‘What or who is the human today can only 
be understood by incorporating the posthuman and non-human dimensions’.27 In other words, the 
question of what it means to be human is inextricably linked to the question of what it means to be 
non-human and/or posthuman. For Braidotti, ‘the posthuman’ – which is irreducible to ‘a dystopian 
vision of the future’28 – is a defining feature of the present. To be exact, it constitutes ‘both a historical 
marker of our condition and a theoretical figuration’.29
(1) As a historical marker, it designates a spatiotemporally specific constellation: arguably, we have 
been witnessing the rise of a new era, which may be described as ‘the posthuman condition’.30 In 
essence, it is characterized by the convergence of two major forces: posthumanism31 and post- 
anthropocentrism.32 The former is concerned, above all, with ‘the critique of the Humanist ideal of 
“Man” as the allegedly universal measure of all things’.33 The latter takes issue with the modern doxa 
of ‘species hierarchy and anthropocentric exceptionalism’.34 Although these two central terms 
overlap in many ways and are often employed interchangeably, they should be differentiated: 
they refer to distinct sets of conditions – both epistemically, in terms of their respective ‘intellectual 
genealogies’,35 and empirically, in terms of their respective ‘social manifestations’.36 Braidotti’s aim, 
then, is to carry out ‘a balancing act between posthumanism and post-anthropocentrism’,37 but 
without establishing an opposition between humanism and anti-humanism, which has been 
a subject of controversy in continental philosophy for some time.38
Two noteworthy developments that mark ‘the posthuman condition’ in a fundamental sense are 
the Fourth Industrial Revolution39 and the Sixth Extinction,40 affecting both human and non-human 
inhabitants of the Earth. The former is based on ‘the convergence of advanced technologies, such as 
robotics, artificial intelligence, nanotechnology, biotechnology, and the Internet of Things’.41 In this 
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constellation, the boundaries between digital, physical, and biological forces have become increas-
ingly blurred.42 The latter is characterized by the gradual extinction of different species due to 
human activity,43 taking place in an era frequently called ‘the Anthropocene’.44 The far-reaching 
significance of these interconnected events is aggravated by two corresponding modes of accelera-
tion: systemic accelerations, generated by advanced capitalism (economic level), and environmental 
accelerations, associated with climate change (ecological level). It is in this macro-historical context 
that we are confronted with ‘the posthuman challenge’.45
(2) Given the complexity of this challenge, ‘the posthuman’ – as a theoretical figuration – is, and will 
remain, ‘work in progress’.46 As ‘a navigational tool’47 and ‘a working hypothesis’,48 it serves as 
a conceptual framework to flesh out ‘the kind of subjects we are becoming’49 in a period that appears 
to pervade all forms of planetary life with an unprecedented degree of indeterminacy.50 Thus, our 
‘fast-changing posthuman times’51 – which may also be described, optimistically, as a ‘postmodern 
convergence’52 or, pessimistically, as a ‘posthuman predicament’53 – are shaped by ‘posthuman 
subjects’.54 In order to do justice to their complexity, we need to develop ‘an enlarged, distributed, 
and transversal concept of what a subject is and of how it deploys its relational capacities’.55 Such 
a multifaceted approach has to be prepared to dislodge the ideology of ‘human(ist) 
exceptionalism’56 (and, by implication, that of ‘Western exceptionalism’57), by accounting for our 
‘relational dependence on multiple non-humans and the planetary dimension as a whole’.58
The posthuman world, therefore, is constructed through the ontological intertwinement of 
human and non-human forces, whose spatiotemporal situatedness in the universe obliges us to 
explore subjects ‘across multiple axes’59 and, hence, in terms of their ‘transversality’.60 This paradigm 
shift is expressed in the proliferation of numerous trans- and multi-prefixed categories – such as 
‘trans-sex and transgender’,61 ‘trans-species’,62 ‘multi-species’,63 ‘trans-corporeality’.64 In this novel 
historical context, ‘[w]e need a subject position worthy of our times’65 – that is, a subject whose 
subjectivity is conceptualized in such a way that its transversal constitution is understood as both 
a product and a producer of the posthuman condition. ‘By “posthumanizing” subjectivity, it can be 
re-positioned as a dynamic convergence phenomenon across the contradictions of posthumanism 
and post-anthropocentrism’.66 Having briefly considered the former, let us reflect on the latter.
II. Post-Anthropocentrism
Similar to its epistemic counterpart (i.e. ‘posthumanism’), the concept of ‘post-anthropocentrism’ 
enjoys a certain degree of interpretive elasticity. Notwithstanding the variety of meanings that may 
be attributed to this term, it articulates – in most cases – a desire to reject the twin ideas of ‘species 
supremacism’67 and ‘human exceptionalism’.68 In Braidotti’s framework, it is combined with the 
ambition to make a case for ‘species egalitarianism’ and ‘monistic vitalism’. As such, it aims to 
challenge, and to leave behind, ‘the Eurocentric humanistic representational habits’69 of the 
Enlightenment, whose ‘philosophical anthropocentrism’70 manifests itself in the seemingly unassail-
able ‘centrality of the human – as Man and as Anthropos’71 – in the universe in general and in worldly 
affairs in particular. Such an anthropocentric view of planetary existence portrays humanity as the 
crown of planetary evolution. For Braidotti, however, the construction of ‘the human’ has been, and 
continues to be, intimately interrelated with the creation of ‘anthropomorphic others of “Man”’.72 
These dehumanized subjects are ‘the sexualized and racialized others claiming social justice and 
rejecting exclusion, marginalization, and symbolic disqualification’.73 In other words, they are the 
individual and collective actors who are effectively treated as ‘less human’, ‘half-human’, ‘subhuman’, 
or ‘non-human’ by those who set the hegemonic agenda of modern anthropocentrism.
i. Decentring Anthropocentrism
Braidotti’s critique of anthropocentrism seeks to encourage the production of ‘posthuman 
knowledge’,74 which has two important implications: first, it urges us to conceive of ourselves ‘as 
members of a species, and not just of a culture or polity’75; and, second, it compels us to face up to 
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‘the disastrous planetary consequences of our species’ supremacy and the violent rule of sovereign 
Anthropos’.76 In brief, we are equipped with the capacity to construct and to transform our own life 
conditions but also, in a more fundamental sense, the existential constellations affecting other 
beings.
Braidotti’s ‘posthuman sensibility [. . .] aims at overcoming anthropocentrism’,77 by drawing on 
Spinoza’s ‘monistic worldview’,78 according to which ‘matter is one, driven by the desire for self- 
expression and ontologically free’.79 Instead of relying on binary constructions, such a monistic 
approach insists on ‘the unity of all living matter’80 in the universe. For Braidotti, ‘monistic premises 
are [. . .] the building blocks for a posthuman theory of subjectivity that does not rely on classical 
Humanism and carefully avoids anthropocentrism’.81 The emphasis that Spinozist and neo-Spinozist 
frameworks place on ‘the unity of all matter’82 is corroborated by ‘the self-organizing or “smart” 
structure of living matter’83 – an insight that is essential to cutting-edge developments in the life 
sciences, biosciences, neural sciences, and cognitive sciences.
As indicated above, the terms ‘posthumanism’ and ‘post-anthropocentrism’ should not be used 
interchangeably. The former has influenced, and in turn been influenced by, the humanities – 
notably key disciplines such as philosophy, history, cultural studies, literary studies, and human 
geography. The latter draws its epistemic resources from, and has made valuable contributions to, 
numerous so-called scientific fields of investigation – above all, ‘science and technology studies, new 
media and digital culture, environmentalism and earth-sciences, bio-genetics, neuroscience and 
robotics, evolutionary theory, critical legal theory, primatology, animal rights, and science fiction’.84 
As illustrated in the aforementioned list of relevant subjects, the post-anthropocentric study of the 
world comprises unprecedented degrees of ‘trans-disciplinarity’,85 which are symptomatic of the 
variety and complexity of the issues at stake. Given the powerful role of expert knowledge, skills, and 
equipment in shaping the contemporary world, it is not surprising that science and technology 
studies can be regarded as a flourishing area of inquiry in the current era.86 The same, of course, 
cannot be said of the humanities, which appear to be finding it increasingly difficult to justify their 
raison d’être in market-driven economies and metrics-obsessed universities.87
ii. ‘Zoe’ as Generative Vitality: Between Codifiability and Commodifiability
There is little doubt that the most striking characteristic of the global economy in the twenty-first 
century is its ‘techno-scientific structure’.88 More specifically, it is founded on the convergence of 
four key branches of techno-scientific expansion: (1) nanotechnology, (2) biotechnology, (3) 
information technology, and (4) cognitive science.89 These interrelated domains are major driving 
forces in terms of blurring traditional boundaries between human and non-human aspects of life 
on Earth. An obvious example of this trend is the prevalence of the ‘bio-genetic structure’90 of 
contemporary economies, whose centrality is reflected in the financial and institutional resources 
devoted to the Human Genome project, stem cell research, and biotechnological modes of 
intervention into ‘animals, seeds, cells, and plants’.91 Advanced forms of capitalism have succeeded 
in investing in, extracting profits from, and exercising considerable control over globally inter-
connected processes of ‘the commodification of all that lives’.92 Ironically, the systemic primacy of 
commodification, imposed by the profit-driven logic of capitalism, reinforces the ontological 
primacy of life, highlighted by monistic vitalism. Thus, we are confronted with ‘a paradoxical 
and rather opportunistic form of post-anthropocentrism on the part of market forces which 
happily trade on Life itself’.93 The potential to commodify everything – including life itself – 
represents a constitutive feature of an economic system in which all aspects of existence can be 
governed by the pursuit of exchange value.
A significant presuppositional facet of Braidotti’s post-anthropocentrism is the tenet that ‘intel-
ligent vitality or self-organizing capacity’,94 far from being an exclusive characteristic or privilege of 
human beings, is ‘present in all living matter’.95 The question that poses itself in this context is why 
living matter is ‘intelligent’ in the first place. The mono-vitalist answer to this question is that all living 
matter is equipped with and driven by ‘informational codes’.96 These codes not only ‘deploy their 
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own bars of information’97 but also ‘interact in multiple ways with the social, psychic, and ecological 
environments’.98 Put differently, living matter is both codified and codifying.
Unlike social constructivism, Braidotti’s monistic vitalism posits that all living matter is both 
‘intelligent and self-organizing’.99 Crucially, ‘[t]he relational capacity of the posthuman subject’100 
– that is, the subject’s ability to relate to both the external world and its internal world in a critical, 
cognitive, responsive, adaptive, and creative manner – is not an exclusive privilege of the human 
species; rather, it represents an empowering resource of ‘all non-anthropomorphic elements’101 in 
the multi-species sphere of life.102 This ‘non-human, vital force of Life’103 may be referred to as zoe,104 
as opposed to bios105 or anthropos.106 For Braidotti, zoe is ‘the dynamic, self-organizing structure of 
life itself’,107 epitomizing both the principle and the reality of ‘generative vitality’.108 As a ‘transversal 
force’,109 zoe cuts across, links, and brings together ‘previously segregated species, categories, and 
domains’.110 On this view, post-anthropocentrism embraces ‘the politics of life itself’.111 According to 
this epistemic postulate, ‘life’ is irreducible to ‘the exclusive property or the unalienable right of one 
species, the human, over all others or of being sacralized as a pre-established given’.112
Instead of being ‘reserved for anthropos, that is to say bios’113 (and, hence, for Homo sapiens), 
‘life’ – in the broad sense of zoe – comprises the entire realm of non-human, notably animal, 
existence. Such a holistic conception of ‘life’ may be described as ‘zoe-centred egalitarianism’,114 
which is integral to Braidotti’s plea for a ‘post-anthropocentric turn’115: this paradigm shift is not only 
a passionate defence of ‘species egalitarianism’ but also ‘a materialist, secular, grounded, and 
unsentimental response to the opportunistic trans-species commodification of Life that is the logic 
of advanced capitalism’.116 It is not only a celebration of life, understood in terms of species diversity 
and transversality, but also a critique of the multiple ways in which life has been subjected to, and 
colonized by, the instrumental logic of capitalist reproduction.
Committed to scrutinizing the implications of the fact that ‘[t]he opportunistic political economy of 
bio-genetic capitalism turns Life/zoe – that is to say human and non-human intelligent matter – into 
a commodity for trade and profit’,117 Braidotti’s monistic vitalism is an attempt to challenge this 
colonization of all living matter by the imperatives of market systems. It does so by advocating ‘non- 
profit experimentations with intensity’118 and transversality, whose empowering potential is reflected 
in the emergence of posthuman subjectivities. This is not to underestimate, let alone to deny, the 
integrationist power of capitalism, owing to its systemic capacity to co-opt and to re-appropriate the 
critical, cognitive, responsive, adaptive, and creative faculties of ordinary actors. This is to recognize, 
however, that ‘the potential for experimentation with new subject formations’,119 capable of subvert-
ing the constraining logic of ‘life as surplus’120 under capitalism, is indispensable to individual and 
collective endeavours aimed at replacing systems of social domination with practices of human (and 
non-human) emancipation.
iii. The Post-Anthropocentricity of the Global Economy
Whether it be in relation to flora or fauna, stem cells or bacteria, or indeed any other form of life on 
Earth, the value-creating and market-driven framework of ‘the opportunistic political economy of 
bio-genetic capitalism induces, if not the actual erasure, at least the blurring of the distinction 
between the human and other species when it comes to profiting from them’.121 The extension of 
anthropos and bios to zoe feeds into the ‘logic of insatiable consumption alongside various speci-
mens of humanity’.122 Reinforced by the worldwide interconnectedness of processes of production, 
circulation, and consumption, ‘[t]he global economy is post-anthropocentric in that it ultimately 
unifies all species under the imperative of the market and its excesses threaten the sustainability of 
our planet as a whole’.123 Viewed in a positive light, this unprecedented degree of global inter-
connectedness points to the possibility of transnational and trans-species solidarity; viewed in 
a negative light, it reminds us of our pan-human and pan-species ‘bond of vulnerability’.124 This 
condition is shared by and affects all living beings on the planet, as illustrated in major environ-
mental challenges (such as climate change) as well as significant medical challenges (such as 
epidemics and pandemics, particularly those caused by intra- and/or inter-species infections).
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Understandably, this situation has led to a sense of collective anxiety, not only ‘about the future of 
both our species and [. . .] our humanist legacy’125 but also, at a more fundamental level, about the 
health of planetary life – in short, zoe. This concern is expressed by thinkers from across the political 
spectrum – such as Jürgen Habermas,126 Francis Fukuyama,127 Peter Sloterdijk,128 and Giovanna 
Borradori.129 Unlike these scholars, however, Braidotti – given her posthuman inclinations, imbued 
‘with distinct anti-humanist feelings’130 – is not wary of ‘the prospect of a displacement of the 
centrality of the human’131 and, in fact, insists on ‘the advantages of such an evolution’,132 which – in 
her view – reflects the emancipatory potential inherent in ‘post-anthropocentric practices’133 
oriented towards zoe-guided ‘species egalitarianism’. The new ‘nature–culture continuum’,134 
which lies at the heart of Braidotti’s monistic vitalism, may even call the very notion of ‘species 
integrity’135 into question, as captured in the concept of ‘Ex-“Man”’,136 which appears to shatter any 
illusions about species singularity, let alone ‘species supremacy’.137
To recognize that ‘the political economy of bio-genetic capitalism is post-anthropocentric in its 
very structures, but not necessarily or automatically post-humanistic’,138 requires acknowledging 
that, while it effectively promotes the ontologically grounded actualization and market-driven 
intensification of the ‘nature–culture continuum’,139 its participants may deliberately or unwittingly 
continue to subscribe to an ideological framework asserting the species-constitutive distinctiveness 
of humanity. The holistic post-anthropocentrism endorsed by Braidotti’s monistic vitalism, however, 
seeks to break out of the straitjacket of the opportunistic post-anthropocentrism reinforced by bio- 
genetic capitalism. The former, unlike the latter, is motivated by a resolutely ‘deconstructive 
move’140: as such, it deconstructs – and, thus, both rejects and subverts – not only any implicit or 
explicit assumptions concerning the humanist vision of ‘species supremacy’,141 but also ‘any linger-
ing notion of human nature, anthropos and bios, as categorically distinct from the life of animals and 
non-humans, or zoe’.142 This paradigmatic transition entails a deep redrawing of the map of life, 
which, in its revised – that is, zoe-based – variant, gives equal weight to all (that is, both human and 
non-human) forms of existence. It represents ‘a sort of “anthropological exodus” from the dominant 
configurations of the human as the king of creation’143 and, at the same time, as the queen of 
codified knowledge – ‘a colossal hybridization of the species’.144 In short, we have entered the 
posthuman era.
Having disassembled the shaky foundations of the alleged centrality and primacy of anthropos, 
the symbolic and material ‘boundaries between “Man” and his others’145 collapse. The 
Anthropocene represents a geological age in which human activity has been, and continues to 
be, the dominant source of influence on the environment, including the climate.146 To the extent 
that the ecological challenges with which we are faced in the twenty-first century are ‘man’-made, 
the ‘burden of responsibility’147 falls squarely on the shoulders of the human species, which is ‘the 
primary cause for the mess’.148 According to Braidotti, it would be naïve, however, to contend that 
just as ‘technological progress’ has generated this global problem, it will be the key to resolving it. 
Such an approach would not only be based on yet another version of ‘technological 
evolutionism’,149 if not ‘technological determinism’,150 but also fall into the trap of ‘species 
supremacism’151 and ‘human exceptionalism’,152 both of which are part of Western anthropo-
centrism. By contrast, Braidotti argues for the construction of a vitalist-materialist – that is, 
human/non-human – alliance:
As a brand of vital materialism, posthuman theory contests the arrogance of anthropocentrism and the 
‘exceptionalism’ of the Human as a transcendental category. It strikes instead an alliance with the productive 
and immanent force of zoe, or life in its non-human aspects.153
In the context of the posthuman condition, capitalizing on this alliance is both a challenge and an 
opportunity: as a challenge, it obliges us to transcend traditional conceptual, methodological, and 
empirical boundaries, notably those established between human and non-human forms of exis-
tence; as an opportunity, it generates new possibilities for confronting the large-scale contradictions 
and predicaments with which we are faced in the twenty-first century.
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Three axes of transformation are crucial to Braidotti’s post-anthropocentric account of the 
posthuman condition: (1) becoming-animal,154 (2) becoming-earth,155 and (3) becoming-machine.156 
(1) The becoming-animal axis underscores the principle of ‘trans-species solidarity’,157 recognizing 
our symbiosis with, and dependence on, other species.158 (2) The becoming-earth axis stresses issues 
related to ‘environmental and social sustainability’,159 drawing attention to our reliance on, but also 
domination and exploitation of, the world around us. (3) The becoming-machine axis highlights the 
ever more profound intertwinement of humans and technology, demonstrating that we can regard 
‘biotechnologically mediated relations as foundational for the constitution the subject’.160 These 
axes not only involve a categorical rejection of anthropocentrism but also build the tripartite 
foundation for post-anthropocentrism.
III. The Critical Posthumanities
Inspired by the cross-fertilization of posthumanism and post-anthropocentrism, Braidotti’s ‘critical 
posthumanities’161 (also referred to as ‘Critical PostHumanities’,162 ‘Transversal Posthumanities’,163 
and ‘Contested Posthumanities’,164 or – more cautiously – ‘Conflicting Humanities’165 and 
‘Posthuman Humanities’166) are aimed at exploring the emergence of radically transformative modes 
of knowledge production, circulation, and consumption. The critical posthumanities are firmly situated 
in ‘the fast-moving landscapes of cognitive capitalism’.167 In essence, they can be considered 
a discontinuous continuation of the humanities in the posthuman era. One of the greatest challenges 
for the humanities in the current context has been to re-invent themselves in the face of ‘the decline of 
the primacy of “Man” and of Anthropos’.168 This is not to suggest that they have abandoned their 
humanist roots, but, rather, to maintain that they have had to revise their presuppositional under-
pinnings, some of which seem obsolete in the posthuman age.
i. The Multiplicity of the Humanities
In the epoch of posthuman and post-anthropocentric challenges, the critical posthumanities have 
been ‘emerging as post-disciplinary discursive fronts, not only around the edges of the classical 
disciplines but also as off-shots of the more marginal, interdisciplinary critical discourses that tend to 
call themselves Studies’.169 In fact, there has been an explosion of new types of humanities170:
● Among the ‘scientifically oriented’ variants are the Ecological Humanities and Environmental 
Humanities, Medical Humanities (also referred to as Bio-Humanities), Neural Humanities, and 
Evolutionary Humanities.
● Among the ‘socially and culturally oriented’ variants are the Public Humanities, Civic Humanities, 
Community Humanities, Translational Humanities, Global Humanities, and Greater Humanities.
● Among the ‘economically oriented’ (and effectively ‘neoliberal’) variants are the Interactive 
Humanities and Entrepreneurial Humanities.
● Among the ‘technologically oriented’ variants are the Digital Humanities, also known as 
Computational, Informational, and Data Humanities.
Some of these are sub-divided into further categories, indicating that increasingly diversified and 
fragmented fields are in the process of developing. This rapid expansion and transformation of the 
humanities is illustrated in the creation and divulgation of several neologisms – such as 
‘PostHumanities’,171 ‘Inhuman Humanities’,172 ‘Transformative Humanities’,173 ‘Emerging, Adjectival, 
and Muscular Humanities’,174 and ‘Nomadic Humanities’.175
ii. From the Humanities to the Critical Posthumanities
For Braidotti, the critical posthumanities rest on numerous key assumptions, two of which are 
particularly important:
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(1) At the epistemological level, they are at once posthuman(ist) and post-anthropocentric. Thus, 
they posit that the knowing subject is ‘neither homo universalis nor Anthropos alone’.176 On this 
account, the world contains a complex ensemble of knowing entities, embedded in the dynamic 
web of both human and non-human agents, whose functional interconnectedness confirms the 
power of zoe/geo/techno-related forces in the construction of reality. Intelligent vitality, self- 
organizing capacity, and epistemic codifiability are inherent in, and indeed essential to, all zoe/ 
geo/techno-based constellations in the universe.
(2) At the ontological level, they are species-egalitarian. Hence, they refuse to establish a species 
hierarchy, according to which some forms of life are superior (and/or inferior) to others. In this sense, 
scholars devoted to the posthuman project are committed to building ‘a positive relationship to the 
diversity of zoe – non-human life – in a non-hierarchical manner, recognizing the respective degrees 
of intelligence, ability, and creativity of all organisms’.177 Such a holistic-vitalist perspective permits 
us to conceive of zoe-, geo-, and techno-based entities not only as cognitive agents but also as 
epistemic partners – that is, as real-world players whose knowledge-generating and knowledge- 
applying capacities can, and should, be cross-fertilized. On this view, the life-enriching processes of 
thinking and knowing – far from being reducible to ‘the prerogative of humans alone’178 – are, in one 
way or another, carried out and, to different degrees and in different contexts, developed by all 
agents situated in and engaging with the world. Indeed, it is through ‘the coexistence of multiple 
organic species and technological artefacts alongside each other’179 that organic beings and 
computational networks are ‘eco-sophically connected’,180 allowing for the continuous (re-)con-
struction of a ‘living continuum’181 that – in its monistic totality – is simultaneously zoe-, geo-, and 
techno-based.
The notion that the posthumanities are, by definition, critical is important in (1) thematic, (2) 
methodological, (3) conceptual, and (4) political terms.182
(1) In thematic terms, they engage not only with a wider range of human subjects than the 
classical humanities, but also with non-human subjects and objects, including technological – 
notably digital – forces. This extensive thematic coverage is accomplished without erecting an 
artificial normative hierarchy between human and non-human agents. As a consequence, they 
regard ‘terrestrial, planetary, cosmic concerns as serious agents and co-constructors in processes 
of collective thinking and knowing’.183 To recognize the cognitive and epistemic capacities of non- 
anthropomorphic entities requires accepting that ‘we’ – that is, all thinking and knowing agents – 
‘are in this together’.184
(2) In methodological terms, one of their most significant attributes is their commitment to inter-, 
trans-, and even supra-disciplinary inquiry.185 This reflects a profoundly critical attitude, motivated 
not by the aim of policing disciplinary boundaries, but, rather, by the ambition to dislodge – and, if 
possible, to transcend – the self-referential mechanisms by means of which epistemic and institu-
tional comfort zones are maintained within the canons and curricula of mainstream academia. The 
critical posthumanities encourage, and depend on, processes of inter-, trans-, and supra-disciplinary 
‘cross-hybridization’,186 rather than the stifling mechanisms of intra-disciplinary dogmatization.
(3) In conceptual terms, they reject the myth of ‘a de-naturalized social order’187 – that is, of human 
life forms detached and abstracted from their ‘environmental and organic foundations’.188 They 
compel us to explore ‘the multilayered interdependence between “naturecultures” today’,189 
reminding us that traditional binaries – such as human/non-human, cultural/natural, social/indivi-
dual, rational/emotional, learned/innate, arbitrary/determined, autonomous/heteronomous – fail to 
do justice to the complexity of ‘zoe/geo/techno mediations’.190
(4) In political terms, they provide ‘an alternative to the neoliberal governance of academic 
knowledge, dominated by quantitative data and control’191; at the same time, they pursue ‘a re- 
negotiation of its terms’.192 Put differently, they move both within and beyond neoliberal forms of 
governance associated with advanced capitalism. On the one hand, they are able and willing ‘to 
participate in corporate culture, in finance and industry’.193 On the other hand, they are committed 
to critiquing, deconstructing, and subverting the neoliberal doxa and hegemony. They contribute to 
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the proliferation and cross-fertilization of cutting-edge discourses in academia, they are suspicious of 
the degree to which research and teaching agendas are increasingly ‘over-coded by and interwoven 
with financial investments’.194 Given their ambivalent position, they are simultaneously complicit in 
and critical of ‘the profit-driven logic of advanced capitalism’.195 In brief, they exist both within and 
beyond capitalism.
For Braidotti, then, the ‘posthuman convergence’196 is a profoundly ambivalent affair: it comprises 
both negative and positive, retrograde and progressive, repressive and emancipatory dimensions. 
Accepting that it is simultaneously entrapping (potestas) and empowering (potentia),197 it should 
become clear that we are dealing not with a question of ‘either/or’ – that is, either complicity with the 
logic of capitalism or the assertion of individual and collective autonomy – but, rather, with a matter 
of ‘and . . . and’.198 Thus, ‘the transversal discourses and practices’199 of the critical posthumanities 
are, at the same time, contributing to and taking issue with ‘the epistemic accelerationism that fuels 
cognitive capitalism’.200 They articulate a ‘counter-project’,201 in the sense that they not only draw 
attention to the detrimental repercussions of ‘the profit-driven capitalization of advanced 
knowledge’202 but also make a case for ‘transversal discursive and institutional structures’203 and 
practices, by means of which they seek to engage with the world in a ‘transformative and compas-
sionate manner’.204 Instead of being ‘profit-minded’205 and controlled by hegemonic forces, such an 
approach is ‘minorities-driven’,206 giving a voice to the voiceless and defending the interests of 
marginalized groups across different sectors of society.
The critical posthumanities remind us of the fact that ‘we’, the inhabitants of planet earth, are not 
only interconnected – across space and time, as well as across ontological boundaries defined by zoe/ 
geo/techno-related forces – but also internally fractured. The divisions between human actors – 
which are intersectionally constituted by, and structurally embedded in, key sociological variables 
(such as class, ethnicity, gender, age, and ‘ability’) – extend to all zoe/geo/techno-related forces: our 
engagement with, access to, and appreciation of reality depend on our asymmetrically organized 
positioning in the world, which is in turn contingent on our capacity to obtain, and to draw on, 
socially relevant resources.207
The critical posthumanities are not meant to be yet another version of epistemic relativism, let 
alone postmodernism.208 Building on the grassroots practices, experiences, and contributions of 
‘communities of thinkers, scholars, and activists’,209 their existence hinges on the daily construction 
and reconstruction of ‘alternative collective assemblages’,210 capable of composing and represent-
ing ‘a new “we”, a missing people’211 – that is, an ensemble of human and non-human agents, largely 
ignored, if not effaced, by the classical humanities. Such a shift in emphasis generates a dynamic and 
inclusive space for ‘new eco-sophical, posthumanist, and post-anthropocentric dimensions in con-
temporary knowledge production’,212 enriched by the confluence of ‘zoe/geo/techno-mediated 
perspectives’213 and, hence, by the multiplicity of agents shaping the development of the world in 
the twenty-first century.214
iii. Between Reproduction and Transformation
Two considerations are vital when evaluating the flourishing discourses of the critical 
posthumanities:
(1) The critical posthumanities can be regarded as diversified ways of ‘expressing and reacting 
responsibly to the epistemic acceleration of cognitive capitalism’.215 In this sense, they are capable of 
exposing the degree to which the governance of universities is dominated by metrics-focused 
agendas, designed in accordance with the pursuit of economic profit, as reductively defined by 
the ideology of neoliberalism, whose hegemonic position is reinforced by organizational regimes 
associated with neomanagerialism. Faced with this scenario, the critical posthumanities convey 
a ‘new discursive energy’,216 encouraging knowledge-generating subjects to engage in both inter- 
and ‘extra-disciplinary encounters’,217 both within and outside academic settings, in a way that 
stimulates the proliferation of constructive and creative exchanges ‘across a broad spectrum of 
corporate, civic, public, artistic, and activist venues’.218
10 S. SUSEN
Since the critical posthumanities contribute to the – in many respects, unorthodox and experi-
mental – production, circulation, and consumption of knowledge, they resonate with the ‘new spirit 
of capitalism’,219 whose success story cannot be divorced from principles such as ‘elasticity’, ‘absorb-
ability’, and ‘adjustability’.220 In this sense, they confirm, rather than undermine, the systemic 
capacity – enjoyed by capitalist forms of governance – to re-appropriate and to co-opt the emanci-
patory potential of critique and justification221 for the purpose of stabilizing different modes of 
‘complex’ (as opposed to ‘simple’) domination.222
(2) The critical posthumanities interpret the aforementioned trends and developments as 
manifestations of the growing influence of ‘minor science and minoritarian assemblages’.223 
These are ‘more autonomous, radical, and potentially subversive’224; similar to new social 
movements,225 they tend to rely on ‘non-institutionalized practices and discourses’,226 favouring 
grassroots dynamics, which are firmly situated in people’s lifeworlds and take seriously their day- 
to-day experiences. This leads us to the distinction between ‘Majoritarian, Royal sciences’ and 
‘minor or nomad sciences’.227 The former tend to follow ‘an axiomatic model of scientific 
experimentation’228 with the aim of developing ‘universal theorems and set rules’.229 The latter 
unfold ‘in the problematic mode’230 in that they are situated in ‘the dynamic materiality of the 
phenomena themselves’231 and operate, so to speak, ‘on the ground’. The former are concerned 
with ‘what is stable’232 and, hence, with the mission of uncovering underlying laws and causal 
mechanisms. The latter are interested in ‘flows of becoming’,233 whose radical indeterminacy 
escapes the stifling logic of the scientific obsession with ‘patterns’ based on regularity, causality, 
and functionality.
The shift from the former to the latter modes of inquiry has profound epistemological implica-
tions, in that it indicates a move away from ‘the passive application of pre-set technical skills’234 
towards ‘the relational and open approach’235 of the travelling gaze. The possibility of ‘generative 
cross-pollination’236 permits minor and nomadic researchers to release ‘hybrid off-springs and new 
heterogeneous assemblages’,237 whose emancipatory potential exists because of, rather than 
despite, their constitutive indeterminacy. Such a post-disciplinary outlook is motivated by ‘the active 
desire to actualize unprecedented modes of epistemic relations’,238 built by nomadic subjects able to 
generate nomadic humanities.239
IV. Limitations
Let us turn to examining some of the main limitations of Braidotti’s ‘posthuman condition’ thesis, 
notably with regard to the extent to which it sheds new light on the ways in which both human and 
non-human actors’ engagements with the world are shaped by the confluence of zoe-, geo-, and 
techno-based dimensions.
i. ‘The Subject’ and ‘Subjectivity’?
Given that Braidotti remains firmly embedded in a poststructuralist framework, it is far from clear 
why she wishes to hold on to the concept of ‘the subject’. Granted, owing to the Foucauldian 
presuppositions underpinning her approach, it makes sense for her to advocate a posthumanist 
and post-anthropocentric conception of ‘subjectivity’. Indeed, as she affirms, ‘[b]y “posthuma-
nizing” subjectivity, it can be re-positioned as a dynamic convergence phenomenon across the 
contradictions of posthumanism and post-anthropocentrism’.240 Thus, subjectivity exists within 
a spatiotemporally contingent field of tensions. More specifically, ‘posthuman subjectivity’241 
can be conceived of as ‘a process of becoming in its own immanence and not in binary 
oppositional terms’.242 It is in a permanent state of flux, and its multilayered constitution does 
not follow a binary, let alone monolithic, logic of functioning. At the same time, it is irreducible to 
the ‘Homo Universalis of Humanism’243 and the ‘Anthropos of anthropocentrism’,244 since it is ‘a 
structural relational capacity’245 that defies the rigid logic of a fixed sense of ‘human nature’ or 
‘human essence’. For Braidotti, subjectivity is ‘both post-personal and pre-individual’,246 in that it 
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finds itself situated in a dynamic, and largely unpredictable, process of ‘constant negotiation 
with multiple others and immersed in the conditions that it is trying to understand and modify, if 
not overturn’.247 On this view, among the key features of human subjectivity are malleability, 
negotiability, unpredictability, multiplicity, contingency, and – above all – relationality.
A noteworthy problem with this account of subjectivity, however, is that, despite its advocate’s 
nominally anti-essentialist stance, it relies on effectively essentialist – or at least quasi-essentialist – 
assumptions about the very nature of what it means to be ‘human’. For the aforementioned 
characteristics are constitutive elements of any human creature – that is, they are traits that are 
inherent in our species-specific condition.
This reflection takes us to Braidotti’s conception of ‘the subject’ in general and her conception 
of ‘the posthuman subject’ in particular. She maintains that ‘[p]osthuman subjects are a work-in- 
progress’248 and that, furthermore, ‘they emerge as both a critical and a creative project within the 
posthuman convergence along posthumanist and post-anthropocentric axes of interrogation’.249 
One may legitimately object, however, that at least the first part of this statement applies not only 
to (post-)human but also to non-human subjects. By definition, all living beings are ‘a work-in- 
progress’, in the sense that they are constantly developing and, as spatiotemporally situated 
beings, responding to different, and incessantly evolving, environments and historical 
circumstances.
This leads us to another issue, namely the question of ‘we’. Who are ‘we’?250 Braidotti claims that 
posthuman subjects ‘explore the multifaceted and differential nature of the collective “we”’.251 In 
other words, the ‘we’ to which she is referring cannot be reduced to a monolithic, let alone 
transcendental, entity; rather, given its relational constitution, we are dealing with a multilayered 
and highly differentiated form of ‘we’, whose posthuman constitution is indicative of the posthuman 
era. According to Braidotti, ‘“[w]e” are in the process of becoming posthumanist and post- 
anthropocentric’.252 We do so as embodied and embedded selves, since ‘we are deeply steeped in 
the material world’253; and we do so as transversal selves, since ‘we connect [with] but also differ from 
each other’.254 Bonded by our ‘ontological relationality’,255 we are – in vitalist terms – ‘variations on 
a common matter’.256 Yet, paradoxically, ‘we differ from each other all the more as we co-define 
ourselves within the same living matter – environmentally, socially, and relationally’.257 Just as we 
share our ontological relationality with all other living beings, we differ from each other due to our 
context-dependent specificities.
One of the main problems with this approach, however, is that the notion of ‘we’ that lies at its 
core is both vague and presumptuous: it is vague because it is not clear whether it comprises all or 
only some living beings; at the same time, it is presumptuous because the contention that we are all 
in the process of becoming posthumanist and post-anthropocentric is far-fetched. If we include non- 
human agents in our definition of ‘the subject’, then the question arises whether all zoe-based beings 
(including animals, seeds, cells, and plants) – and, indeed, all geo- and techno-based forms of 
existence – can be included in this category. If the answer is ‘yes’, then we are faced with an 
inflationary conception of ‘the subject’, which, owing to its denotative elasticity, fails to do justice 
to the species-constitutive distinctiveness of human life.
Of course, one may come to Braidotti’s defence by insisting that one of the principal aims of her 
project is to undo the boundaries between different kinds of ‘subject’ and ‘subjectivity’ (notably 
‘human’, ‘inhuman’, ‘posthuman’, and ‘non-human’) and that, in some instances, the ‘we’ she 
envisages is more or less clearly defined.258 After all, she urges us to ‘think of ourselves as planetary 
subjects, rather than as global agents’.259 Crucially, the types of subject she has in mind include both 
‘the human and [the] inhuman inhabitants of this planet’.260 If, however, we – effectively – include 
every form of existence (that is, ‘human’, ‘inhuman’, ‘posthuman’, and ‘non-human’) in our definition 
of ‘subject’ and ‘subjectivity’, then these terms lose conceptual force, since, in an omni-onto- 
epistemological fashion, they refer to everything and nothing.
Even if, in a narrow sense, we reserve the concept of ‘the subject’ for members of our species, it 
seems erroneous to assume that all human beings are going through the process of being converted 
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into posthuman(ist) and/or post-anthropocentric actors. Ironically, the intersectional divisions to 
which Braidotti rightly draws her readers’ attention are the very reason that – to use a modified 
version of an Orwellian aphorism – some human actors are more (or less) posthuman(ist) and/or 
post-anthropocentric than others. Human actors are divided by key sociological variables (such as 
class, ethnicity, gender, age, and ‘ability’). Our position in the world, including our access to socially 
relevant resources, is shaped by these variables. Braidotti’s critical theory of society needs to 
emphasize the fact that the degree to which actors have (or have not) become posthuman(ist) 
and/or post-anthropocentric depends on the social positions they occupy and the social dispositions 
they acquire within the social universe. Otherwise, the bold proposition that we have been witnes-
sing the rise of ‘a new collective subject, a “we-are-(all)-in-this-together-but-we-are-not-one-and-the- 
same” kind of subject’,261 is of merely rhetorical, rather than substantive, relevance.
ii. Egalitarianism?
Braidotti’s framework makes a case for ‘species egalitarianism’, which is embedded in her ‘monistic 
vitalism’. Her belief in justice as a normative ideal that is defined in ‘social, trans-species, and 
transnational’262 terms is summarized in the concept of ‘zoe-centred justice’,263 which is funda-
mental to her plea for a ‘relational ethics’,264 a ‘nomadic ethics’,265 and an ‘affirmative ethics’.266 
The bottom-line justification for this framework, which ties in with ‘the posthuman agenda’,267 is 
the view that ‘we are in this together’.268 Braidotti’s ‘species egalitarianism’ is inextricably linked to 
her ‘monistic vitalism’, according to which, in the posthuman era, all living beings are situated in, 
and interconnected through, a ‘zoe/geo/techno assemblage’.269 On this interpretation, our exis-
tence is composed of a set of living (zoe), geological (geo), and technological (techno) dimensions. 
She rightly insists that we must resist the temptation to present this assemblage in ‘an over- 
simplified manner’.270 Indeed, it would be reductive to portray this historical shift towards the 
gradual consolidation of the posthuman condition in terms of ‘a sort of evolutionary destiny or 
socially inevitable goal’,271 which would be tantamount to teleological determinism.272 While 
Braidotti’s defence of both ‘species egalitarianism’ and ‘monistic vitalism’ is convincing in that it 
draws attention to the structural and processual complexity of planetary existence, it is proble-
matic in other respects:
(1) Teleological accounts of history have long been out of fashion.273 The notion that the rise 
of the posthuman condition does not follow an evolutionary pattern, let alone a teleological 
logic of determinism, is based on a straw-man argument, since hardly any contemporary scholars 
in the humanities, social sciences, or natural sciences would seriously make such a claim. 
Braidotti has a tendency to ground her principal contentions in antithetical statements – that 
is, in assertions that are constructed in opposition to rival positions. In many instances, however, 
these allegedly competing stances are hardly defended by anyone in contemporary academia, 
which makes some of her propositions appear somewhat pointless. Her anti-teleological remarks 
are a case in point.
(2) The concept of ‘relational ethics’ is pleonastic, since there is no such thing as a ‘non-relational 
ethics’.274 By definition, the business of ethics is a relational affair, which requires systematizing, 
defending, and recommending moral assumptions and principles that can – or indeed should – be 
drawn upon when making behavioural decisions in relation to objective, normative, and subjective 
realms of existence. Any attempt to establish a ‘non-relational ethics’ would be not only absurd but 
also futile.
As indicated above, at the heart of Braidotti’s ‘relational ethics’ lies a ‘social, trans-species, and 
transnational’275 understanding of justice. This idea is captured in the concept of ‘zoe-centred 
justice’.276 On this view, her outline of ‘relational ethics’ is intimately intertwined with ‘nomadic 
ethics’277 and ‘affirmative ethics’,278 because ‘we’ – that is, all living beings – ‘are in this together’.279 
Such an ethics is – in Braidotti’s words – ‘not just the application of moral protocols, norms, and 
values, but rather the force that contributes to conditions of affirmative becoming’.280 As such, it 
represents a vitalist project, which, by definition, rejects the anthropocentric assertion of ‘the 
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sovereign individual’ à la Kant.281 Braidotti’s emphasis on ‘radical relationality’282 is an attempt to 
account for the deep connectedness of all human and non-human agencies. These agencies – far 
from being ‘sedentary and protocol-bound’,283 let alone guided by ‘Categorical Imperatives’284 – are 
mobile, contingent, and nomadic. In short, they are relational. In light of the ontological condition of 
‘radical relationality’,285 the posthuman subject ‘cannot afford to restrict the ethical instance within 
the limits of human otherness, but has to open it up to inter-relations with non-human, post human 
[sic], and in-human [sic] forces’.286 Even if, however, one accepts that this concern with ‘radical 
relationality’287 is an essential ingredient of Braidotti’s approach, the concept of ‘relational ethics’ 
remains a pleonasm, since the very idea of a ‘non-relational ethics’ is an oxymoron.
One may favour deontological ethics (emphasizing the civilizational role of ‘principles’ and 
‘reason’), utilitarian ethics (stressing the socio-ontological benefits derived from focusing on ‘con-
sequences’ and ‘outcomes’), virtue ethics (highlighting the species-constitutive significance of ‘vir-
tues’ and ‘good traits’), sentimentalist ethics (underscoring the importance of ‘emotions’ and 
‘feelings’), nomadic, affirmative, or vitalist ethics (underlining the species-transcendent force of 
‘radical relationality’), or alternative approaches in moral philosophy.288 Given the preponderance 
of relationality289 in the confluence of objectivity, normativity, and subjectivity, there is no way one 
will be able to make a convincing case for a ‘non-relational ethics’, let alone a non-relational 
conception of reality.
(3) Braidotti’s posthuman narrative suffers from a lack of engagement with species-constitutive 
elements – that is, with those qualities that distinguish us from other species and, in this sense, make 
us ‘human’. Arguably, among these species-constitutive facets are the following: culture, language, 
consciousness, self-awareness, selfhood, personhood, identity, subjectivity, agency, morality, aes-
thetic judgement, and reason – to mention only a few.290 Even if we broadly accept Braidotti’s 
tripartite framework, which is expressed in the notion of a ‘zoe/geo/techno assemblage’, we are 
confronted with the challenging task of having to identify the attributes by which different forms of 
existence – including different species – can be distinguished from one another. We run the risk of 
endorsing a kind of ‘vitalist relativism’ in general and ‘species relativism’ in particular, if we fail to 
shed light on the features that make us ‘human’.291
To be clear, this is not to negate that humans share numerous important characteristics with other 
living beings, all of which, in their ontological totality, are an expression of zoe. Nor is this to deny that 
humans may share multiple traits, including key cognitive and epistemic capacities, with forms of 
existence that fall into the ‘geo’ or ‘techo’ realms, respectively. Rather, this is to accept that, if we shy 
away from exploring the species-constitutive specificity of the human condition, we may end up not 
only misrepresenting the uniqueness of particular forms of being but also, crucially, ascribing the same 
level of agency – including moral agency – to each of them. The result, of course, would be ontological 
relativism – that is, in Braidotti’s case, ‘vitalist relativism’ and/or ‘species relativism’ – which would put 
‘human rights’ on the same level as the purported rights of any other living beings, regardless of 
whether their existence is zoe-, geo-, or techno-based (or founded on a combination of these 
components). The point is not to advocate an anthropocentric version of ‘species supremacy’, as 
a way of justifying almost anything that members of humanity, through the domination of nature by 
‘men’, may wish to inflict upon their environment. Rather, the point is to acknowledge that there is no 
ultimately defensible conception of moral agency without a critical understanding of distinctively 
human faculties.
iii. Critical Posthumanities?
Braidotti makes a strong case for the rise of the critical posthumanities. Yet, her narrative is also 
problematic on several counts.
(1) Braidotti insists on the extra-, supra-, and post-disciplinary constitution of the critical post-
humanities. When doing so, however, she appears to ignore the fact that academic disciplines – in all 
three key branches of knowledge (that is, in the humanities, the social sciences, and the natural 
sciences) – are still in full swing. Granted, multi-, inter-, and trans-disciplinary research agendas and 
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teaching curricula are increasingly common; indeed, they are widely promoted by funding bodies, 
research councils, governments, audit committees, and assessment panels. This does not mean, 
however, that academic disciplines are being transcended, let alone eliminated, or that they are less 
important in the current era than they used to be in the past.
(2) Just as prevalent academic practices and structures remain intellectually and institutionally 
embedded in disciplinary comfort zones, so does Braidotti’s own oeuvre. Most of her writings fall into 
the areas of philosophy and sociology, but also, admittedly, into neighbouring (disciplinary and sub- 
disciplinary) realms of inquiry, notably science and technology studies. This is ironic, to say the least, 
given her emphasis on the extent to which the critical posthumanities are meant to be a sphere of 
‘extra-disciplinary encounters’292 and experimental ‘supra-disciplinary hybridization’.293 If anything, 
her own work – notwithstanding its considerable qualities and valuable contributions – at once 
transcends and reinforces disciplinary boundaries. Most empirical or ‘hard’ scientists, for instance, 
will be suspicious of the – at times – obscure, long-winded, and convoluted style in which parts of 
her ideas are presented, not to mention the poststructuralist tenets on which they are based and the 
failure to substantiate them with solid empirical evidence.
(3) Braidotti warns against ‘the quest for disciplinary purity’294 and the obsession with ‘the 
policing of disciplinary purity’.295 She fails to concede, however, that almost no twenty-first- 
century scholar would seriously pursue such a dubious enterprise. In other words, this is another 
straw-man argument, since the putative ideal of ‘disciplinary purity’, if it has ever been earnestly 
chased by anyone, is not a major concern articulated by contemporary researchers. Straw-man 
constructions of this kind make Braidotti’s line of argument weaker, not stronger. Who would 
seriously deny that most, if not all, forms of erudite analysis, in order to be truly authoritative, 
draw – explicitly or implicitly, consciously or unconsciously, deliberately or unwittingly, directly or 
indirectly – on knowledge generated within different disciplinary realms of inquiry?
(4) As indicated above, the contention that we have been witnessing ‘a tendency towards the 
nomadic abandoning of disciplines’296 – and, by implication, ‘a nomadic shift towards the critical 
posthumanities’297 – is, at best, an exaggeration or, at worst, an outright misrepresentation of an 
academic landscape that continues to be deeply rooted in, and to function within intellectually 
cultivated and institutionally reinforced parameters of, disciplinary and sub-disciplinary modes 
of investigation. By contrast, the assertion that one can observe a tendency ‘towards the 
generation of “grand challenge” style problems that provide the appropriate mise en scène for 
the disciplines to array themselves within unchanged but interlocking corrals’298 is appropriate, 
in the sense that ‘big-issue challenges’ – such as economic crisis, poverty, nuclear rearmament, 
climate change, global pandemics, etc. – have far from disappeared. Indeed, they affect the 
critical posthumanities no less than their predecessors. Yet, this trend has led not to ‘a spasming 
of disciplines’299 but, rather, to their strengthening – not only because most researchers con-
tinue to be firmly situated within their epistemic comfort zones, but also due to the neomana-
gerialist imposition of ‘a culture of audit and performance review’,300 which produce 
a somewhat deceptive ‘sense of the reliable tractability of brains and ideas’.301 If anything, 
however, these managerialized mechanisms of audit culture, performance assessment, and 
steering capacity boost, rather than undermine, the presence of disciplinary types of 
functioning.
(5) Throughout her work, Braidotti insists on the importance of overcoming dichotomies and 
binaries, but it is far from obvious whether or not she succeeds in accomplishing this task herself. On 
many levels, it appears that – to put it crudely – she wants to have it both ways. To illustrate this 
point, let us consider the following examples: (a) her belief in the Deleuzian idea of ‘the “empirical 
transcendental”’302; (b) her distinction between Majoritarian-Royal and minor-nomad sciences; (c) her 
attempt to reconcile the complicit with the critical aspects of the posthumanities’ relationship to 
capitalism in general and neoliberalism in particular; and (d) her ambition to combine humanist and 
anti-humanist positions in her posthumanist project.
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(a) With regard to the empirical/transcendental dichotomy, it is ironic that, while Braidotti is 
strongly opposed to any kind of transcendental accounts of the subject à la Kant,303 she puts 
forward a transcendental (or at least quasi-transcendental) framework herself. For her own approach 
is based on a number of universal(ist) assumptions about the main features of ‘the posthuman 
subject’ and ‘posthuman subjectivity’. Among these features are malleability, negotiability, unpre-
dictability, multiplicity, contingency, and – above all – relationality. These features are not arbitrary, 
as they belong to the very nature of ‘posthuman human creatures’.
(b) With regard to the Majoritarian-Royal/minor-nomad sciences dichotomy, it is surprising, to say 
the least, that Braidotti defends this distinction with such great enthusiasm, while expressing her 
fundamental objections to ‘binaries’ in central parts of her work. In her view, these broad types of 
science stand for two central axes of the knowledge economy, driving epistemic developments in 
the context of the posthuman convergence304:
● The former is ‘contiguous with the epistemic accelerationism of advanced capitalism in the 
service of dominant or “Major science”’.305 The latter builds on a strong engagement with 
minorities, ‘involving an affirmative diversity of knowledge traditions or “minor nomad 
sciences”’.306
● The former is concerned with ‘what is stable’,307 pursuing the goal of identifying patterns by 
uncovering underlying laws and causal mechanisms. The latter focuses on ‘flows of 
becoming’,308 facing up to the different degrees of indeterminacy that we encounter when 
navigating particular spheres of reality.
Interestingly, Braidotti affirms that ‘[t]he relationship between these qualitatively distinct practices is 
neither binary nor dialectical, but [. . .] constituted by constant negotiations and contestations’.309 On 
closer examination, however, it becomes evident that she – following Deleuze and Guattari – 
unwittingly presents these two modes of scientific inquiry in a way that follows a binary logic.
Moreover, this distinction is problematic insofar as it is based on the reduction of scientific 
activities to two ideal types,310 which, at best, fail to do justice to the complexity of research practices 
or, at worst, create a simplistic normative binary of ‘bad’ vs. ‘good’:
● on the one hand, a demonized caricature of reactionary (i.e. mainstream, conventional, and 
conservative) research mechanisms;
● on the other hand, a romanticized ideal of emancipatory (i.e. alternative, grassroots, and 
subversive) research practices.
A critical theory of scientific research needs to provide a nuanced, rather than dichotomous, account 
of the tension-laden and multilayered intellectual and institutional processes shaping different forms 
of knowledge production, circulation, and consumption in the twenty-first century.
(c) With regard to the complicit/critical dichotomy, it is far from obvious whether or not – and, if so, 
to what degree – these two parts of the equation can be reconciled. In essence, Braidotti suggests 
that the critical posthumanities can exist both within and beyond neoliberal forms of governance 
associated with advanced capitalism. On the one hand, they are able and willing to follow the 
systemic logic of corporate structures and practices, which not only prevail in key – notably industrial 
and financial – sectors of the economy but, in a more fundamental sense, permeate almost every 
sphere of life on earth. On the other hand, they are committed to critiquing, deconstructing, and 
subverting the neoliberal doxa and hegemony, especially with respect to its detrimental, disempow-
ering, destructive, and exploitative consequences. Surely, one may concede that the commodifica-
tion of everything – encompassing the commodification of life itself – represents a constitutive 
feature of the ubiquitous systemic logic emanating from capitalism. Insofar as critiques of capitalism – 
including their most radical versions – are, in one way or another, absorbed and re-appropriated, if 
not colonized, by its systemic logic, it remains an open question to what extent it is possible to step 
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outside the constraining horizon of instrumental rationality, sustained by the interplay of states and 
markets. If Systemimmanenz is sufficiently systemic to force us to remain trapped in its immanence, 
then Systemtranszendenz will be nothing but a futile attempt to transcend what is always already 
immanent in our life forms. A genuinely critical theory of society, while having to deal with its own 
contradictions, needs to explore the conditions under which emancipatory constellations can 
emerge within structurally confined spaces that are colonized by systemic imperatives of 
domination.
(d) With regard to the humanist/anti-humanist dichotomy, it is striking that Braidotti seeks to 
combine these two – diametrically opposed – positions. On the one hand, she declares that she is 
‘inclined towards anti-humanism’.311 On the other hand, she affirms that she has ‘no difficulty in 
recognizing that these ideals are perfectly compatible with the best humanist values’.312 This 
tension-laden stance illustrates that Braidotti has been strongly influenced by both ‘anti-humanist’ 
and ‘humanist’ figures (such as Michel Foucault and Immanuel Kant, respectively), as well as by 
scholars who have sought to cross-fertilize these two intellectual traditions (such as Edward Said). 
Once again, however, it is far from clear whether or not these two positions are logically compatible. 
One may conceive of Braidotti’s paradigm shift in Hegelian terms: 
Humanism ðthesisÞ þ Anti-Humanism ðantithesisÞ ! Posthumanism ðsynthesisÞ:
Granted, none of these intellectual movements can, or should, be portrayed as entirely homo-
geneous, since each of them is internally fragmented and marked by multiple currents of thought. 
Nonetheless, their respective advocates are united by common sets of beliefs, assumptions, and 
principles. The question, therefore, is whether or not humanist and anti-humanist approaches can be 
combined, cross-fertilized, or even integrated – and, if so, what the payoff of such an endeavour 
would be.
For the sake of thematic focus, let us consider the concept of ‘humanity’, which, for obvious 
reasons, is crucial to Braidotti’s ‘humanism + anti-humanism → posthumanism’ dialectic. Although, 
admittedly, different humanist thinkers endorse different conceptions of humanity, most – if not all – 
of them subscribe to the view that all members of the human species (that is, notwithstanding the 
stratifying impact of class, ethnicity, gender, age, ‘ability’, and/or other sociological variables) share 
a number of anthropological – that is, species-constitutive – features. Among the most common 
‘candidates’ for these defining elements are the following: culture, language, consciousness, self- 
awareness, selfhood, personhood, identity, subjectivity, agency, morality, aesthetic judgement, and 
reason – to mention only a few.313
Surely, one may regard this list as incomplete, one may favour some of the attributes it 
contains over others, and one may insist that some of them are – albeit in different forms and to 
different degrees – possessed by non-human agents that are part of the ‘zoe/geo/techno 
assemblage’.314 Still, it is hard to see how the humanist notion that humanity possesses species- 
constitutive traits that distinguish its members from other entities can be reconciled with the 
anti-humanist, let alone posthumanist, assertion that the belief in their existence, never mind 
their world-historical significance, is little more than a transcendental illusion promulgated by 
anthropocentric ideologies.
Conclusion
The main purpose of this paper has been to examine the validity of the contention that, over the past 
decades, we have been witnessing the rise of the ‘posthuman condition’. Drawing on the work of 
Rosi Braidotti, the preceding investigation has covered several key issues arising from the in-depth 
analysis of her principal contributions.
The first part has centred on the concept of posthumanism, suggesting that it reflects a systematic 
attempt to challenge humanist assumptions underlying the construction of ‘the human’. As 
a historical marker, ‘the posthuman’ signals the rise of a new era, defined primarily by the Fourth 
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Industrial Revolution and the Sixth Extinction. As a theoretical figuration, ‘the posthuman’ compels 
us to account for the profound interdependence of human and non-human forces.
The second part has focused on the concept of post-anthropocentrism, demonstrating that it 
articulates a desire to reject the twin ideas of ‘species supremacism’ and ‘human exceptionalism’, 
which it seeks to replace with ‘species egalitarianism’ and ‘monistic vitalism’. Braidotti’s post- 
anthropocentric approach indicates that the posthuman condition is based on three axes of 
transformation (that is, ‘becoming-animal’, ‘becoming-earth’, and ‘becoming-machine’), which – 
owing to their intertwinement – cut across traditional epistemological and ontological 
boundaries.
The third part has been concerned with the concept of critical posthumanities, positing that its 
advocacy hinges on the cross-fertilization of posthumanism and post-anthropocentrism – an ambi-
tious endeavour aimed at exploring the emergence of radically transformative modes of knowledge 
production, circulation, and consumption. As an inter-, trans-, and supra-disciplinary venture, the 
critical posthumanities intend to equip us with the epistemological, methodological, and conceptual 
resources necessary to study the confluence of zoe-, geo-, and techno-based forces.
The fourth part has offered an assessment of the ‘posthuman condition’ thesis, evaluating the 
extent to which it sheds new light on the ways in which our engagements with the world are shaped 
by the confluence of zoe-, geo-, and techno-based dimensions. As elucidated above, the ‘posthuman 
condition’ thesis – irrespective of its significant limitations and internal contradictions – raises various 
theoretical and empirical questions, the importance of which is illustrated in the relevance of 
Braidotti’s oeuvre to understanding contemporary societies.
Finally, one may legitimately ask to what degree Braidotti’s inquiries make valuable contributions 
to recent and ongoing debates on socio-philosophical issues such as ‘exclusion’, ‘engagement’, and 
‘empathy’. In light of the previous analysis, there can be little doubt that, notwithstanding some 
noteworthy shortcomings, Braidotti’s writings provide a powerful conceptual framework for addres-
sing these matters.
With regard to the first theme, Braidotti’s approach reminds us that it is far from obvious who 
(and what) should be included in, and who (and what) should be excluded from, normative agendas 
of fundamental rights.315 It is one thing to recognize that planetary forms of existence, including 
human societies, are characterized by practices and structures of inclusion and exclusion. It is quite 
another to maintain that, in principle, all living beings have not only exactly the same right to 
assert their ‘will to live’ but also the capacity to create a vitalist space of planetary existence devoid 
of (both intra- and inter-species) mechanisms of exclusion, let alone discrimination, domination, 
and exploitation.
With regard to the second theme, Braidotti’s approach reminds us that our engagements 
with the world are shaped by the confluence of zoe-, geo-, and techno-based dimensions. It is 
relatively uncontroversial to assert that these engagements are intersectionally constituted 
by, and structurally embedded in, key sociological variables (such as class, ethnicity, gender, 
age, and ‘ability’). It is unclear, however, to what extent a more equitable distribution of 
socially relevant resources will make it possible to ensure that our multifaceted engagements 
with the world enable us to realize the emancipatory potential of humanity in a way that 
benefits not only ‘the few’ but also ‘the many’, including the countless non-human forms of 
existence. As physical beings, we are immersed in objectivity; as social beings, we are 
immersed in normativity; as self-aware beings, we are immersed in subjectivity.316 It remains 
an open question whether or not (and, if so, which) non-human forms of existence also 
engage both with their environments and with themselves through the ontological trinity of 
objectivity, normativity, and subjectivity.
With regard to the third theme, Braidotti’s approach reminds us that our capacity to feel, to 
build, and to develop empathy with others is not limited to the relationships we establish with 
our fellow human beings. In fact, this central faculty is also nourished by the perspective-taking 
processes we may perform when relating to other – that is, non-human – living beings. Arguably, 
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this vitalist propensity expresses our need to search for sources of resonance in the plenitude of 
life forms that have emerged, and continue to emerge, in the world by which we are 
surrounded.317 As members of a sentient species, we cannot feel good about ourselves in 
a morally valuable way unless we feel with and for others. Of course, the question of the degree 
to which our capacity for empathy can, and should, extend to non-human life forms is 
a contentious one. In its most radical version, this view is based on a sort of vitalist universalism, 
according to which, in principle, all living beings can develop varying levels of empathy with one 
another. Granted, we may do so when taking on different, often conflicting, roles in the theatre 
of existence – notably as individuals, members of social groups, members of humanity, inhabi-
tants of the earth, and/or inhabitants of the universe or multiverse. Crucially, however, our ability 
to understand and/or to feel what another person or being is experiencing from within their 
frame of reference – that is, our capacity to place ourselves in the position of someone or 
something else – is a manifestation of cognitive, affective, and/or somatic empathy. If intra- and 
inter-species empathy is a reality, then we have a will to live (and to appreciate) life because, as 
ontological vitalists, we want others to live (and to appreciate) life as much as we do. This does 
not mean, however, that we can, or should, put all species on an equal footing, let alone pretend 
that other species are equipped with the same critical, reflexive, and moral capacities as human 
beings.
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